By Eric Anschutz
We are told that Iran is moving toward acquisition of nuclear weapons. Iranian officials deny that charge with some vigor, asserting that their open interest in uranium enrichment (which can be a key to bomb-building) is solely in support of their ongoing peaceful and wholly legitimate nuclear power reactor program. As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran long ago agreed to not build or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and to allow inspection of their nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Nuclear reactors (to generate electricity) need to be fueled with uranium enriched to a moderate extent. Nuclear bombs require uranium enriched to a higher level. To remove any concern about their ultimate purpose, Iran had originally agreed to forgo the enrichment process entirely, and to fuel its reactor with enriched fuel bought from Russia – the country from which it had previously acquired its now nearly complete power reactor.
Some time ago, however, Iran ended its self-imposed freeze on enrichment, asserting that as a sovereign nation it had the right to a complete nuclear fuel cycle, including in-country enrichment of fuel needed for their reactor. The Iranians have since been openly constructing enrichment centrifuges. However, they continue to assert that their purpose is only to provide fuel for their reactor. Moreover, their centrifuge production (monitored all along by the IAEA) has been proceeding at only a moderate pace and on a modest scale. A reasonable assumption is that, even if the Iranians have ideas about bomb-building, they are at least ten years away from being able to enrich to a level required for that purpose.
The US, Russia, France, Germany and Britain state that “Iran must not be permitted to possess nuclear weapons.†Even Iran has not openly disputed that assertion; it continues to hold to its pledge of “peaceful uses only.†The issue here is whether Iran will be permitted to continue with its enrichment program. In resolving that issue, it should be remembered that the IAEA continues to monitor the program with periodic inspections. Unfortunately, there is disagreement in the interpretation of IAEA findings. The US has recently suggested that inspection results point to an acceleration of Iran’s enrichment efforts. On that basis, the administration now asserts that Iran is a mere three years away from bomb-building capability, not the ten years that had been the prevailing assumption earlier. IAEA officials have labeled that assertion “pure speculation and misinformation…It comes from people who are seeking a crisis, not a solution to the confrontation over Iran.â€
How the Crisis Might Be Handled
We would all prefer, of course, that Iran stay away from nuclear weaponry. The whole idea behind the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is that the world is better off with fewer, rather than more, countries in possession of nuclear weapons. That notion is as true today (perhaps truer) than it was in 1968, when the NPT came into being. We Americans, sitting astride the most powerful military on earth (and thousands of atomic weapons of our own) cannot know Iran’s true motivations in this matter. But in considering how the Iran crisis might best be dealt with, we should begin by asking why that country might want to possess nuclear weaponry. Here are a few possible reasons:
• Deterrence. Iran’s neighborhood includes Israel, Pakistan, India, China and Russia, all of which are nuclear-weapons states. It also includes Iraq, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, all hosts to the US military, which maintains both conventional and nuclear arsenals that dwarf any others on earth.
• Respect. A nuclear arrow in the quiver of a third-rate power confers a kind of distinction and invites respect. Iran has surely taken note of the tempering of American bravado against North Korea since Kim Jong Il’s acquisition of nuclear weaponry.
• Possible Use. It might be speculated that Iran has plans to use nuclear weapons, or to threaten their use, or to transfer them (clandestinely) to Al Queda or another non-national terrorist group. I would dismiss this notion as very unlikely, if only because all nations know that nuclear use will always lead to nuclear reprisal. The use of nuclear weapons is inevitably, at least in the longer term, a suicidal act.
So far, the Iran nuclear issue has been a matter for diplomats and scientists, politicians and intelligence analysts. Hot debates have taken place in the corridors and boardroom of the IAEA. Resolutions have been drafted and discussed at the United Nations.
Now, however, discussion and drafting of papers is giving way to threats and rattling of sabers. If Iran backs down in the face of sanctions or for reasons of its own, and agrees to abandon its enrichment efforts, the crisis will abate. If not, the US and its allies will face tough choices.
Our Secretaries of State and Defense, and our Vice President, when asked about this matter, have said repeatedly that “all options are on the table,†leaving Iran and others in no doubt that military force is not being ruled out. Israel, too, has left open the possibility of air attacks on Iran’s enrichment facilities.
It is hard to believe, given the Iraq quagmire in which we are already embroiled, and the clear evidence that our “intelligence†on WMD matters is fallible (to put it mildly), that our leaders could seriously contemplate a second Mid-East military adventure when the first one is now so widely regretted. Here are some further reasons against the use of military force:
• It is reported that Iran’s enrichment facilities are widespread, and that there are some whose location is unknown, so “surgical†air strikes might not work. Whatever is left would be driven into even deeper concealment, and IAEA inspectors would surely be barred from Iran. We would have driven Iran behind a desert curtain.
• Bombing attacks are certain to result in collateral damage – some civilians would be certain to die. Given intelligence uncertainties, some of our strikes would inadvertently annihilate such things as pharmaceutical factories (or hospitals or schools) wrongly identified as enrichment centrifuges facilities.
• Our campaign for “hearts and minds†in Iran and our hope to win support from Iranian moderates will be set back a decade or more. In the face of our military attack, Iranians of all stripes will rally around their leaders, and hostility (and terrorist attacks) against the US will reach new highs. Indeed, the US will be further vilified all over the Mid East – and our moral standing will further erode across the world.
• Iran, which is the world’s fourth largest producer and exporter of oil, will withhold or divert oil exports, as might Venezuela and the United Arab Emirates and Nigeria. The consequent rise in energy prices will disrupt the US economy, result in increased inflation, further increase our deficit and adversely affect our balance of payments.
So, bearing in mind why Iran might have an interest in nuclear weapons, what should we do? One possibility is to accept Iran at its word, and to provide technical assistance to them in matters of enrichment and in their buildup of nuclear power plants in return for continued pledges from them to allow IAEA inspections, and further pledges of “no military use.†A second possibility would be to dissuade Iran from their unjustified fears of nuclear attack from another country. Third, we might assure Iran that we intend an early departure of our military forces from Iraq, and from the Mid East generally.
In suggesting these ideas, I have not forgotten the inane if not insane statements of Iran’s new president regarding the holocaust and Israel. Those matters need to dealt with too, but diplomacy is all about dealing with one problem at a time.